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Abs TrAc T
The aim of this working paper is to analyze the inclusion of political 
humor into the set of actions used by opponents to the Syrian regime 
during the first year of a state-wide uprising in 2011. The research ar-
gues that although political humor has traditionally been seen mainly 
as a concealed voice against dominant elites, it can nevertheless take a 
confrontational stance and challenge a regime. In this paper we assess 
the role of political humor in challenging the legitimacy of the Syrian 
State through the battle for the signification of events. We will work 
with a theoretical framework that draws its assumptions from social 
movements’ studies and cultural studies. Through the assessment of 
the importance of discourse and the role of ideological domination to 
a regime we will see how the first year of the Syrian uprising included 
widespread acts of political humor as part of the strategy against the 
regime.
Key words: Humor, political opposition, Resistance – Syria, Revolutions – 
Syria, popular revolts
resum
L’objectiu d’aquest document de treball és analitzar la inclusió de les 
polítiques d’humor en el conjunt d’accions utilitzades pels opositors al 
règim sirià durant el primer any de revolta, el 2011. La investigació 
sosté que tot i que l’humor polític ha estat vist tradicionalment com 
una veu oculta contra les elits dominants, també pot prendre una 
postura de confrontació i desafiar un règim. En aquest treball s’avalua 
4el paper de l’humor polític per desafiar la legitimitat de l’estat siri a 
través de la lluita pel significat dels esdeveniments. El marc teòric està 
basat en l’estudi dels moviments socials, així com en els estudis cultur-
als i en l’anàlisi del discurs. Mitjançant l’avaluació de la importància 
del discurs i del paper de dominació ideològica del règim, veurem com 
el primer any de revolta a Síria va incloure actes generalitzats d’humor 
polític en el marc de l’estratègia d’oposició al govern sirià.
Paraules clau: Humorisme; Oposició política; Resistència al govern – Síria; 
Revolucions – Síria; revoltes populars
resumen
El objetivo de este documento de trabajo es analizar la inclusión de las 
políticas de humor en el conjunto de acciones utilizadas por los oposi-
tores al régimen sirio durante el primer año de revuelta, en 2011. La 
investigación sostiene que aunque el humor político ha sido visto 
tradicionalmente como una voz oculta contra las élites dominantes, 
también puede tomar una postura de confrontación y desafiar a un 
régimen. En este trabajo se evalúa el papel del humor político para 
desafiar la legitimidad del estado sirio a través de la lucha por el sig-
nificado de los acontecimientos. El marco teórico está basado en el es-
tudio de los movimientos sociales, así como en los estudios culturales 
y en el análisis del discurso. Mediante la evaluación de la importancia 
del discurso y del papel de dominación ideológica del régimen, vere-
mos como el primer año de revuelta en Siria incluyó actos generaliza-
dos de humor político en el marco de la estrategia de oposición al go-
bierno sirio.
Palabras clave: Humorismo; Oposición política; Resistencia al gobierno  
– Siria; Revoluciones – Siria; revueltas populares
5Every Joke is a Tiny Revolution
George Orwell, 
An Age Like This: 1920-1940 
To the Syrian People in their quest for Freedom and Dignity.
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91 .  InTroducT Ion1
On the 15th March 2011, several incidents with protesters in Syria fi-
nally galvanized a state-wide uprising directed against the regime. The 
demonstrations demanding the release of young children who had 
been arrested for painting anti-regime slogans on their school’s walls 
turned into a popular uprising. The level of torture and violence that 
the children had suffered sparked the outrage over the country. On the 
18th April 2011 in Homs, demonstrators tried to occupy the Clock 
Square, in an attempt to emulate the occupation of Tahrir Square in 
Cairo, Egypt. They were met with heavy reprisal from the Syrian Army. 
After the failed attempt, a mock Clock Tower made out of cardboard 
could be seen in demonstrations across the country. 
The Syrian uprising still goes on as we write these pages, and it has 
entered the stage of open civil war. More than 30.000 people have lost 
their lives and thousands others are illegally arrested, tortured or dis-
appeared2.
The popular demonstrations and nightly marches were the sign of 
the uprising until the heavy casualties of peaceful demonstrators and 
the subsequent defections in the Syrian Army lead to armed protection 
groups and ultimately to the establishment of a so-called Free Syrian 
Army (FSA)3, with more than two hundred autonomous or semi-au-
tonomous brigades operating across Syria. The first self-appointed role 
of the FSA and the many brigades was to protect civilians and their 
peaceful protests but they quickly developed offensive operations as 
well with the goal to liberate territory from the state’s control. 
During the first year of the uprising4, however the violence and re-
1. This paper’s research was conducted as part of the Master’s Degree on International 
Relations, Security and Development from the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. The 
research was supervised by Dr. Rafael Grasa Hernández.
2. According to UN estimates (September, 2012).
3. Its creation was announced on a video posted on youtube the 29th July 2011 by a 
defected Colonel named Riad Al-Asad.
4. The anti-regime movements in Syria refer to this ongoing period as the “Syrian Revolu-
tion”. I use the terminology uprising instead of revolution, as I understand the term 
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pression5 rose, many Syrian opponents, activists, still kept a solid stance 
for a nonviolent strategy. Others combined nonviolent tactics with an 
ideological or active support for armed struggle as part of a common 
strategy. Activists still managed to mock and ridicule the regime through 
various original ways, strengthening the links of solidarity among the 
resistance and lifting the spirits against the hardships of repression. Art, 
and especially humor, accompanied the Syrian uprising. 
But, how is it possible that such dramatic events with dozens of ci-
vilian deaths being reported daily be fertile for political humor? Is po-
litical humor a valid act on the rise among the tactics used by protest-
ers and opponents? Or is it just a desperate act for citizens to help 
them cope with everyday life under oppression? What is its value as an 
oppositional act? Experiences like that of Egypt’s ousting of former 
president Hosni Mubarak by the “25th January Revolution”6 and the 
much publicized use of satiric slogans or chants may have helped the 
idea that political humor could be a beneficial tool for political nonvio-
lent resistance against a regime. 
My purpose in this research is to explore how humor can become 
subversive and specifically the ways in which popular culture and po-
litical humor become part of the open resistance against the Syrian 
Baathist regime in a period of instability, of social and political tur-
moil such as the period from 15th March 2011 to 15th May 2012 in 
Syria. 
I do not intend to decode the meanings of words and symbols as 
entrenched in a culture of communication7, but rather to determine 
revolution to be more ideologically charged. I will use the term revolution when refer-
ring to the activists’ expressions but my choice of uprising has to do with the fact that 
the period analyzed in this research is an insurrection or revolt that has shaken the 
structures of the country and might lead to deep political changes that have yet to be 
seen or to be specifically and ideologically outlined.
5. I define repression as a set of coercive measures or the threat of their use that are ac-
quired by dominants to enforce a policy by the State. In Charles Tilly’s words: “the costs 
of collective action to a group resulting from interaction with other groups” (1977:14).
6. Popular name given to the 18 days period where a popular movement throughout Egypt 
but especially in urban space succeeded in toppling President Hosni Mubarak and end-
ing his 30 year rule over the country. 
7. AlShaer, 2008.
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the entrenchment of the acts of political humor within an open resist-
ance strategy against the Syrian state. 
The ImporTAnce oF The syr IAn cAse
In the study “Humor as a serious strategy of nonviolent resistance to 
oppression”, Majken Jul Sorensen focused on the Serbian Otpor op-
positional movement as a successful but unusual case of the impact of 
humor in bringing down the oppressive regime of Slovodan Milosevic. 
The choice of the Otpor case was useful to the field in the sense that its 
impact was perceivable by a broad part of the society. It was a concrete 
example with concrete collectively-organized actions that could be 
tracked back in time. Even its activists and their intentions or percep-
tions could be reached through personal interviews. Sorensen argues 
that “looking more closely at the unusual, we can often get more in-
formation about the less unusual” (Sorensen, 2008: 169). 
The case of Syria is probably the opposite example in two senses. 
Syria is interesting for the permanent and continuous role of humor 
and its indirect and parallel inscription in a wider strategy of confron-
tation. To note how secondary or parallel actions such as humoristic 
acts inscribe, increase, decrease or move from the dissimulation and 
euphemistic acts towards a more direct confrontation can be very use-
ful in determining its impact in, unfortunately, usual cases when all 
non-violent opposition is overcome by violent opposition and the con-
flict escalates into an armed struggle. The study of political humor in a 
context of confrontational and open conflict shall determine the im-
portance of ideology and legitimacy at two levels: in reassessing or 
challenging the dominant’s status within the structure of domination 
and in promoting engagement of oppressed within the oppositional 
movement. 
On the other hand, we are not studying a coordinated or purposeful 
strategy of an organized group as the Otpor case referred to. Our aim 
is to overcome the dichotomy between organized and unorganized po-
litical action in order to acquire a broader perspective of the culture of 
resistance and opposition among the Syrian people. Based on previ-
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ous studies of theory of resistance (see Scott, 1985 and 1990 or Tilly, 
1977), we can guide ourselves through the complex network of resist-
ance’s actions in an open conflict and determine its links and purposes 
within an opposition, the Syrian one, that is especially marked by its 
complexity, division and local autonomy.
sTrucTure oF Th Is  reseArch
I have structured this paper into three different parts. Firstly, I have 
tried to compile the literature about social movements and nonviolent 
resistance, from theoretical frameworks that could be of use to my 
analysis and to study the case of oppositional actions classed as politi-
cal humor. This compilation has helped me in building up a frame-
work for my own research, and this framework is also limited and de-
tailed in Chapter 2 “Analytical Framework”. Applying the analysis to 
the Units of study has been done and explained through Chapter 3 
“Political Humor in the Syrian uprising”. Some discussion on the re-
sults can be found in Chapter 4 “Final Remarks” where I will develop 
also some suggestions for further study and analysis. 
AcknowledgemenTs
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2 .  AnAlyT IcAl FrAmework
Our analysis of political humor in the Syrian Uprising draws its theo-
retical basis from social scientists dealing with the sociology of power 
and social movements. The Gramscian notion and theory of hegemo-
ny and ideological dominance (Gramsci, 1988) and the symbolic pow-
er identified by Bourdieu (1991) will serve us as when analyzing the 
context of power relations in Syria and the importance of cultural and 
ideological dominance in the Baathist State. The question of whether 
political humor is included within the strategy of activists in opposi-
tion cannot be understood without a look at the paramount impor-
tance that the battle for signification of events, the battle for legitima-
cy, plays in a popular uprising. This symbolic power can be challenged 
through different means, as we will see in the case of Syria, one of 
them being political humor. Moreover, we want to study the link be-
tween dissention and the actual acts that challenge directly the exist-
ing power relations (Scott, 1990) and determine if those that refer to 
political humor can be included in a broader confrontational strategy 
(Tilly, 1977).
The main goal that motivates the present research is to determine if 
political humor is part of the set of actions that oppositional move-
ments use against the regime. And if so, how are these actions useful 
or perceived as useful? Oppositional movements have different strat-
egies and goals. Even though the aftermath of the toppling of the re-
gime and how to achieve this change remains problematic, the goal of 
changing the regime structure is shared by all members of the opposi-
tion8. As part of the oppositional acts, how are satirical actions inte-
grated and included, and what is their immediate goal? What is their 
impact?  
8. Opposition can be defined as an organized group of people with a common objective 
that confronts the perpetuation or existence of a government, regime or political struc-
ture in power. In the Syrian case, as in most cases, many argue that there is not an op-
position but rather oppositions as the strategies, tactics and even objectives of opposing 
activist remain varied and sometimes irreconcilable.  
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We will approach the study of two different theorizations that affect 
the use of Political Humor. The concepts put forward in this research 
are mainly based on the works done by Prof. James Scott and Prof. 
Charles Tilly. The combining of both processes and analysis will be 
our main tool for analyzing a situation where a traditionally unimpor-
tant action can become part of a challenging movement to a specific 
power structure. 
In the light of Hirschman’s categorization of political behavior, pro-
test can be shaped in daylight confrontation or rather in a concealed 
manner (1970). It can also question the legitimacy of the State or rath-
er be adopted as part of the parallel strategies that subsist in a context 
of oppression or subordination (Bennani-Chraïbi, 2004). We also 
have to consider what we mean and understand by expression or po-
litical participation, since usually satire and humor are seen as located 
in the “infrapolitics” or “microphysics of power” of Michel Foucault’s 
analysis and thus unchallenging the hegemony of the state (Foucault, 
1991).  Nevertheless, Scott’s categorization of resistance acts will help 
us determine how political humor moves from hidden transcript to 
public transcript, to direct aggression (1990). What are the features 
that could characterize political humor as an act of open aggression 
towards the regime? In other words, why should the regime care about 
a satirical cartoon being carried by demonstrators? And why do these 
demonstrators prepare and draw cartoons as part of their perfor-
mance and behavior in a demonstration? We also want to test Tilly’s 
approach on the repertoire of actions to determine how political hu-
mor is included and its added value among other political actions in 
opposing the regime. If political humor was always considered as an 
action without relevance in the political sphere, is this consideration 
changed in an open confrontation where satire is present an openly 
defiant?
In the uprisings lived throughout the North of Africa and in the 
Middle East from the year 2011 on, political humor has been visible 
and extensively reported in the media. Our goal as social scientists 
here is to try to assess its real role and inclusion in the set of actions at 
the disposal of activists. It would be appropriate to ask, borrowing 
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Charles Tilly’s words, “[…] under what conditions, […], collective ac-
tion appears to form part of a social movement” (Tilly, 1977: 30). In 
this sense, is political humor part of a social movement in Syria? 
The conTexT  oF power relAT Ions
The context of our study is Syria in the first year of the 2011 uprising. 
To be sure, we deal with a non-democratic context that we will define 
as a perceived sentiment in which the subject —be it individually or 
collectively— feels that he/she has “no institutionalized channels of 
political expression” and participation (Bennani-Chraïbi et al., 
2004:19). It is especially the direct experience of the subject what in-
terests us. We are not attempting a description of the State structures 
of domination, but rather we focus here on the links and the perfor-
mance of those structures on the subordinates.  This definition based 
on the subject’s perception allows me to overcome the ontological di-
chotomy between democratic and non-democratic societies, where an 
increase in the perception of non-democracy is not directly related to 
an increase of the totalitarism but rather to what Alain Tourain calls 
the “self-production of society”, the changing collective perception of 
the meanings of the social interactions and of the power relations 
(Tourain, 1977). 
In Charles Tilly’s approach, a repertoire of actions follows the cycle 
of protest and it is determined by the power relations and its changes. 
If we account of the existence of symbolic power as part of the force of 
the state to dominate hegemonically and to preserve its authority, glo-
balization and especially the globalization of social media, satellite tel-
evision and other means of trans-border communication and infor-
mation, can shift the balance and centers of power. The weight of 
propaganda war or of ideological production becomes thus much 
more central9.
9. Franz Fanon already talked about the importance of Radio during Algeria’s war of inde-
pendence. His analysis was especially focused on the impact of radio on contenders and 
the Algerian population. (Fanon, 1959)
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I s  pol I T IcAl humor reAlly pol I T IcAl?
Political satire can legitimize political power or rather have a subver-
sive effect in promoting social and political change (Kishtainy, 1985). 
Some studies suggest that political humor under dictatorships or au-
thoritarian regimes is just a mere ‘safety-valve’ that does not really 
mobilize or promote any active resistance against it (Badarneh, 2011; 
Billig, 2005). Indeed, satire and mockery towards the elite is mostly 
regarded as part of the hidden transcript: jokes, tales, gestures, atti-
tudes or behaviors that cannot be uttered or performed within the 
presence of the dominants. It is thus not seen as part of the direct acts 
of aggression. These analysis are based on a fix picture of a dictatorial 
regime where political humor is a concealed voice that does not op-
pose the regime frontally (Hirschmann in Bennani-Charïbi, 2004). 
Certain mechanisms that occasionally question the regime could par-
adoxically act in favor and strengthen the ruler, in line with what An-
thony Giddens calls the “naturalization of the mind” (Giddens, 1984). 
The safety-valve perspective has so far come with the assumption that 
political humor simply contributes to reduce frustration or aggres-
siveness of the oppressed. There is no factual or historical backing of 
this assumption. If the hidden transcripts are produced by the feeling 
of injustice towards domination and there is no actual change in the 
current domination relations, how can these hidden transcripts pre-
vent oppressed from taking an open path towards reshaping power 
relations? Moreover, the safety-valve theory does not take into ac-
count the power of cognitive production and of counter-symbolic and 
counter-discourse that can be generated through satire and its influ-
ence in the practices of resistance and of political mobilization.
Another dichotomy must be explained in what refers to our re-
search: that is the distinction between hidden transcript and public 
transcript proposed by James Scott (1990). According to Scott hidden 
transcripts are those acts of dissent that occur within a space and 
among a group of people that share the same position in a given rela-
tion of dominance. These transcripts don’t usually reach the other 
side of the power relationship because of the reaction they would en-
17
tail. Hidden transcripts are usually opposed to the public display of 
language, rituals and behaviors that a group or individual performs in 
front of others. In our research, we focus our interest in the line be-
tween public and hidden transcripts. This is the line where Scott sees 
the battle for “testing the limits” (Scott, 1990: p.192), where subordi-
nates, unsure of dominants’ effective powers might bring hidden tran-
scripts to a public sphere. A free social site where theses scripts are 
expressed free from dominants’ knowledge might mean a physical site 
far from the dominant’s presence, or else a coding of gestures or lan-
guage apparently innocent to outsiders. But, bringing hidden tran-
scripts into confrontation might mean bringing the joke physically 
closer to the dominants (from the safety of the family household to the 
street); making the message clearer for them to acknowledge it; or 
rendering it impossible to ignore. Our focus on the line or space be-
tween hidden and public transcript is very useful to understand evolu-
tions and internal processes within a specific regime. When François 
L’Yvonnet’s analyzes the French society of the 21st Century, he finds 
that laughter has been tamed, trivialized, abducted and integrated 
within the accepted, rendering it inoffensive. Even when laughter is 
political, L’Yvonnet does not perceive it as resistance since “resist-
ance doit être animé par un projet”10. Criticizing all politicians 
through the guignol (a popular puppet show of characterized politi-
cians), ridiculing them, does not send a political message except that 
of the trivializing of politics, leveling all politicians or political activi-
ties to a grotesque masquerade. In his analysis, L’Yvonnet is focusing 
on the mainstream media and communication channels and his cri-
tique to them. He does not take into account other layers of humor 
present in the public space because they are only acknowledged by a 
minority that is not so close to the mainstream perception of democ-
racy. Some of these messages that do have a political project are either 
permitted or fought on the basis of municipal laws (against graffiti, 
etc.), but mostly they get lost in the confusion of a loud and chaotic 
scene. 
10. L’Yvonnet in Le Monde Suplement 15-16/04/2012
18
Trivialization of critique is not only the job of liberal democracies. 
Also other authoritarian regimes might restore to this tactic in what 
refers to media. The Algerians say, for example, that when a Syrian 
speaks he is killed, when a Tunisian speaks he is killed (during Ben 
Ali’s regime), but Algerians speak and speak and speak until they die. 
The difference lies, as we will see later, on where the red lines are 
placed and on the reaction of the regime to the trespassing (from polit-
ically-motivated detentions, torture, public ostracism or even the 
cloning of civil society11…).
To apply this analytical framework to satirical production, includ-
ing the new resources and opportunities of new technologies, can help 
us improve theory on popular resistance practices. In fact, a non-rigid 
approach to humor and artistic production can shed some light on the 
multiple functionalities of these acts, as well as on the different rela-
tionships between the use of these productions and the control of the 
state towards them.
2 .1 .  AssumpT Ions To The reseArch
The present research makes different assumptions that must be ex-
plained to proceed. 
The first important assumption is the fact that 1) the regime is not 
exclusively using violence as a means to maintain power, that is as a 
means to make the people, the country, act the way the regime wants. 
If power was exclusively based on torture and repression, political hu-
mor would not be a useful confrontational tool since it is not directly 
challenging military power. 
Secondly we see, 2) Political Humor is repressed and censored un-
der al-Asad’s regime. There is obvious evidence and official admis-
sion of this fact (see for instance Wedeen, 1999). It is also true, how-
ever, that there are no official written guidelines as to what can be 
subject to censorship or repression and what can be acceptable to the 
11. The term «cloning» refers to the state policy or strategy of infiltrating civil organizations 
to create inner dissent or to divide and hinder their work from the inside.
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regime. As professor Lisa Wedeen explains, however, people seem to 
be aware and understand what these guidelines are, that is, what can 
be said and what cannot. 
2 .2 .  un I Ts  oF AnAlys Is  And per Iod oF T Ime
Humor, as defined by Martin (2007), “is the positive emotion of mirth 
invoked in a social context by the perception of playful incongruity 
and expressed through laughter-related behaviors”. In politics the 
unveiling of incongruity is sometimes not funny; it is merely the cour-
age to show the incongruity that makes an artistic expression part of 
the political humor. Political humor might make you smile or nerv-
ously giggle looking around to check who is watching you (Qassim, 
2007).
Freud classifies jokes into two categories: innocent or with a pur-
pose. Jokes with a purpose can be either aggressive or obscene (Freud, 
1966). Political Humor falls into the category of aggressive jokes in the 
sense that its intent is to invert the order of things, reality and the 
power relations within society, even if just momentarily.  The punch 
line unveils a situation that is absurd in the way life is absurd as it is 
based on doubt and mystery. Without doubt there is no humor (Ka-
zarian, 2011). In politics thus, humor unmasks the inconsistency of 
speeches and policies through exaggeration —of policies, personal 
flaws…—, imagining a policy, politician or a plain citizen in an unusual 
situation to contrast the absurdity of their deeds, or even by plainly 
ridiculing the targeted actions (Badarneh, 2011). 
Following these definitions, we focus our work on the actions in-
scribed within the tactics of political humor which comply with the 
following characteristics: 
1. Individual or collective actions part of a folklore or popular cul-
ture produced during the period from 15th March 2011 to 15th May 
2012. 
2. They are public actions with free access according to the availa-
bility and nature of the action
3. They are not intended at realistically portraying or describing a 
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situation but they nevertheless refer to the political situation of Syria
4. They have an implicit or explicit purpose of opposing the current 
regime or authority
5. They are perceived as funny, satirical or mocking
As to the place of development of these actions we include those tak-
ing place in: 
a) New atopical spaces: facebook groups, music videos, mock vide-
os and pictures, drama, puppets, cartoons and animation, etc.
b) Topical space: puppets and drawings, posters, graffiti, street 
performances and chants and slogans.
2 .3 .  sources For dATA
The vast bulk of data for this study is taken from the internet, specifi-
cally referred to me through facebook, twitter, youtube and other web-
sites and blogs; reported to me mainly through these first three plat-
forms. Data and contents have been contrasted through detailed 
scrutiny and personal interviews with members of the resistance in-
side and outside of Syria. I have conducted 5 semi-constructed inter-
views with activists in exile (Turkey and Spain) and two with activists 
inside Syria via Skype (Damascus and Kobani). These interviews are 
not meant to present any quantitative results, but they certainly 
helped me in gaining a deeper grasp of the current context of my case 
study and the daily development of events.
There are natural limits to this research. Firstly, the inclusion of di-
rect actions on the ground, mainly during street demonstrations has 
been done only through verification and study of the material availa-
ble, this is video-actions and videos reporting actions on the ground. 
We will not take into account actions of political humor outside Syria, 
where the context of confrontation and the reach of the Syrian author-
ities are not present and therefore the costs of these actions differ 
enormously12. We are however aware of the possibility that some of 
12. Notwithstanding the pressure and political complexity that the conflict is bringing to 
neighboring countries, such as Lebanon, Turkey or Iraq.
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the internet actions used for this research might have been produced 
outside of Syria. That is why we have tried to center our study not on 
specific productions but on general topics of satire and burlesque re-
dundant within different actions and formats. The actions studied are 
taken into consideration only when they are known and used by the 
Syrian opposition inside, either by reproducing one same topic or 
symbol online and offline or by being verifiably produced inside. 
3 .  AnAlys Is  oF pol I T IcAl
humor In The syr IAn upr Is Ing
In the previous chapter, we have tried to describe the main theories 
that deal with political humor in the perspective of a political action. 
We are dealing now with the role of political humor in the context of 
an open conflict like the first year of the Syrian uprising. The main dif-
ficulty of this analysis lies in the constant reshaping of forces and pow-
er relations that takes place during such turbulent times.  The chang-
ing power-balance forces all intervening agents to constantly reassess 
their available resources and the impact of their actions. 
The exper Ience oF oppress Ion under
The bAATh IsT  reg Ime
Syria has been under the control of the Baath Party since 1963. After 
an unsuccessful and short-lived union with Nasser’s Egypt, a group of 
military officials led by Baathist members took over control of the 
State. In 1971, the Minister of Defense and strongman of the Govern-
ment Hafiz al-Asad was confirmed President of the Syrian Arab Re-
public after a bloodless coup that came to be known officially as “The 
corrective Movement”. Hafiz al-Asad remained President until his 
death in 2000. His son Bashar al-Asad was elected President that 
same year in a referendum where he ran unopposed and has ever since 
been reconfirmed once.
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Although there is a parliament (People’s Council) and legislative 
and presidential elections in Syria, the Baath party controls the coun-
try effectively, as the Constitution states in article 8 “the Arab Socialist 
Baath Party leads the state and the society” and the majority of seats in 
the People’s Council are reserved to the Baath-led coalition of Nation-
al Progressive Front. This disposition was taken out on the 2012 Con-
stitutional reform. However, the control of the Baath party is not only 
limited to the political organs but also of the Syrian economy and so-
cial organization. The regime developed a wide network of informa-
tion and secret services that made very dangerous any form of criti-
cism towards state policies.
American scholar Lisa Wedeen13 identified three rough areas of 
power of control by a regime: a) the material resources, b) the institu-
tions of force and punishment, and c) the production of the historical 
narrative. This third area was of high importance to Hafez al-Asad’s 
rule of Syria, especially since the 70s (Wedeen, 1999), when efforts 
and resources on ideological domination especially raised. Its impor-
tance continued during Bashar al-Asad’s presidency. The power for 
the signification of events represents the capacity by the state to con-
trol and impose a certain narrative, a certain explanation of the world, 
of the reality. The control of the symbolic world is therefore an impor-
tant battlefield where contestants fight for meanings and historical in-
terpretations of events. 
Although Syrians could have felt the three areas of domination as op-
pressive, the conditions did not substantially change from 2010 to 2011 
to explain for a widespread revolt. There was a pauperization of the 
masses and a thinning of middle classes since Bashar al-Asad’s ascen-
sion to power and the implementation of neo-liberal policies. In the 
short term, however, something changed in the spirit of Syrians that 
13. Lisa Wedeen’s book “Ambiguities of Domination” on the use of the symbolic language 
under Hafez al-Asad’s regime was an essential guide to my understanding of the histori-
cal meaning of rhetoric, imagery, spectacle and language in Syrian politics. Her detailed 
description of the rhetoric used by the Baath party and Hafez al-Asad’s regime in spe-
cific events such as the Hama uprising and massacre in 1982 was very useful to me to 
understand the origins and the implications for the emergence of new platforms and 
networks of symbolic and narrative production in the twenty-first century.
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facilitated an open and wide uprising throughout the country14. An un-
deniable factor can be seen in the Tunisian and the Egyptian revolu-
tions. That is, their success. Although the political and social context of 
these countries are very different to Syria’s, the reversal of a situation 
that might have been perceived as inevitable, the realization of the 
power of the oppressed, provided the theoretical counter-ideology that 
allowed Syrians to imagine a change in power relations. “It is as if we 
had been blind. I had never even thought of the possibility of change in 
my country”, a Syrian medical student told me three months into the 
uprising15. The toppling of the Tunisian and Egyptian Presidents led to 
a weakening of the Syrian regime’s persuasive power that was making 
people comply with the authority’s norms. The inevitability of the Syr-
ian regime was cracking. Its legitimacy was, however, still intact. The 
coercive methods were also still there, especially after the brutal tor-
tures of the children of Dara’a. The possibility of change, however, was 
breaking in through the satellite images of a crowded Tahrir Square in 
Cairo chanting “The people want to topple the regime” (al-sh’b yuryd 
īsqāt. al-niz.ām - مﺎﻈﻨﻟا ﻂﻘﺳا ﺪﻳﺮﻳ ﺐﻌﺸﻟا), and through the stories of Mo-
hamed Bouazizi heroic martyrdom in Tunisia. What had changed, 
thus, was the experience of this oppression and the capacity of people 
to imagine alternative realities (Tourain, 1977).
humor And sAT Ire In pol I T IcAl l IFe
There is much literature on the use of discourse, of symbols, of images 
and spectacles in authoritarian regimes, especially in those that tend 
to assimilate the state to the president. We can find various examples 
14. It must be noted, however, that much concern/value was given to the fact that the two 
biggest and more important cities of the country, namely Damascus and Aleppo, did not 
see important acts of support to the uprising until months later. This was explained with 
concern by the opposition by the fact that the regime’s grip was tighter in cities closer to 
the power and, alternatively, valued by supporters of Asad’s regime as the evidence that 
the uprising was lead by Islamists in Sunni regions or even infiltrators crossing the bor-
ders from neighboring countries (to Dara’a from Jordan, Homs and Hama from Leba-
non or even Idlib from Turkey).
15. Interview conducted in Barcelona by the author of this research.
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in the Middle East, with Gamal Abdelnasser, Saddam Hussein or 
Hafez al-Asad as experts in the enforcement of the leader’s cult. There 
is not however much research on the role of art and humor in resist-
ance, as oppositional acts to totalitarian or repressive regimes in the 
Middle East. The importance of cult and compliance to the Syrian re-
gime provides also an example of how the symbolic power, the power 
to impose meaning aligned with the State’s version of reality, is para-
mount in the uprising. Shehata reports of existing rumors that Egyp-
tian presidents Nasser or Sadat were interested in monitoring political 
jokes on the street (1992). Although these were only rumors it shows 
the perceived potential threat of jokes or, at least, the uncensored or 
less censored barometer that they could provide to monitor the re-
gime’s popular support. In Egypt, increasing humor and satire can be 
found in the toughest situations, such as the 1967 defeat of the Six Day 
War and the 25th January Revolution. The Lebanese political scientist 
Asad AbuKhalil notes “[t]hen-President Gamal Abdel Nasser was so 
concerned by the public mockery of his troops that he gave a speech 
warning of the damage that can be done to the community by jokes.”16 
Hegemony of a narrative is a realm that cannot be fought solely with 
weaponry and coercive violence. 
Although most studies agree with the fact that political humor can-
not significantly alter regimes, its use as part of the transgression 
against the power of the state are obvious in the study of the 2011 revo-
lutions in the MENA region. Political humor is used in conveying a 
message and express demands openly. It is interesting to compare the 
treatment of the Hama events to the 2011 Uprising since we can find a 
coherent and parallel narrative in both accounts by the state and its 
official media. The difference, however, lies in the fact that monopo-
lizing the narration of events has become more difficult due to glo-
balized media, the opened space of narration and the continuous flow 
of information production through new technologies and social me-
dia. Thus, “preserving the regime’s monopoly on historical interpre-
16. From his personal blog: http://angryarab.blogspot.com.es/2011/02/what-is-funny-
and-what-is-not.html
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tation” (Wedeen, 1999:42) has become much more difficult. In 1982 a 
rebellion of the Muslim Brotherhood in Hama was met with extremely 
violent retaliation, with aviation bombarding and destroying most of 
Hama’s old city, with the death of between 10-40.000 inhabitants and 
massive extrajudicial executions, detentions and imprisonment. The 
official rhetoric of the events was, according to Wedeen, that the Mus-
lim Brotherhood’s members were ““reactionaries”, “rightists” and 
“vermin” threatening to “contaminate” the body of politics” (Wedeen, 
1999:44). Compare this to the “[c]onspiracies are like germs, after 
all, multiplying every moment everywhere” (Bashar’s Speech, at Da-
mascus University on the 21st June 2011). And again in a speech by 
Hafez al-Asad on the 8th March 1982, “beware of those “who wear the 
clothes of Islam” but are not Muslims” (p.48), as opposed to “It is not 
the fault of Islam when there are terrorists who take cover under the 
mantle of Islam” (Bashar’s Speech, at Damascus University on the Jan 
12, 2012).
In 1982 and the following years, of course, the official rhetoric, 
which provided the formula, the language and symbolism to be used 
to orient the historical events, went practically unchallenged if but for 
clandestine milieus, concealed expressions and external opposition. 
The twenty-first century, however, the narrative has become more po-
rous and alternative, external, clandestine discourses are openly chal-
lenging and competing for the conquest of the public space.
The syr IAn upr Is Ing
Through our research we found mainly 3 main different formats of 
satire used: cartoons and signs, on theatre or mocking performances 
and on oral messages such as jokes, chants or slogans. Cartoons ap-
peal directly to the shared sentiment, have to have a message to the 
point and “the artistic aspect means that the cartoonist is freer to ex-
press his personal views than for instance the journalist”17 that has 
the ontological obligation to contrast facts. Cartoons do not have to be 
17. Andreas Qassim, 2007.
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funny either. They might just gruesomely express a shared feeling. 
The best-known case in the Middle East is probably that of Palestinian 
cartoonist Naje al-Ali, where he powerfully depicts dramatic situa-
tions that appeal to a shared narrative of all Palestinians (see Pic. 1). 
Even in a globalized-digital era, the oral expression remains the 
most common tool of the oppressed against the dominant elite. The 
oral expression is traditionally filled with elements of disguised resist-
ance. The importance of oral expression is sometimes overlooked due 
to the lack of access to it and due to its impermanence and volatility. 
But it is precisely this impermanence that makes of oral expression a 
key resource for the oppressed. The impermanence of the oral actions 
makes them easier to communicate and perform in chosen contexts 
and with chosen audiences. It also might pass from communicator to 
communicator rending the author of the act difficult or nearly impos-
sible to trace back. 
The oral tradition, however, continues to be a very popular form of 
transmission throughout the Arab world with jokes being told in the 
intimacy of friends or family or with theatre, comedy, songs and slo-
gans. Jokes have no author, they are impersonal and part of the folk-
lore and, as such, they are more difficult to stop, to repress and their 
authors more difficult to punish than any other kind of political criti-
cism.
3 .1 .  The messAge :  The Top Ics oF mockery And
sAT Ire
A political joke is offensive when it is “not universally considered to be 
in good taste by all members of society” (Badarneh, 2011).  This makes 
of jokes a way for people to “temporarily overcome their oppressors, 
to momentarily triumph by ridiculing and criticizing”. In a way, po-
litical jokes build an alternative world, they are a fiction that accuses 
directly the regime of a certain injustice, “calling into question the le-
gitimacy of the political system” (Badarneh, 2011). 
As we will describe in this section, we found through our research 
that Syrian activists using political humor against the regime during 
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the 2011 Uprising have developed specific actions that dealt with cur-
rent events. They focused on the key elements of domination and the 
groups holding the power, undermining the bases of this power, tar-
geting directly the authority of the regime.
We could distinguish three main topics around which the plots of 
comedy revolved: 
a) The villains, their policies and discourses. These actions deal and 
refer to the regime, its leaders, its gangs, para-military, army and the 
representation of the enemy as identified by the opposition(s).
c) The international community. It refers rather to the internation-
al “communities”, be it the Muslims of the world, the citizens who sup-
port democracy around the world or even the international powers, 
stakeholders that might swing its support (even through material/fi-
nancial support) towards one side or the other of the actors in the con-
flict.
b) The revolutionaries and their mission, or rather a self-represen-
tation of the opposition(s) of a spotless or ideal image of the popula-
tion and the activists supporting and leading the Uprising. 
These three focus of political humor can be displayed in very differ-
ent formats and intentions as we will see in the following sections. 
A .  The v IllA Ins ,  The Ir pol Ic Ies And d Iscourse
In resistance and nonviolent uprisings, traditional theory talks about 
the importance of differentiating between the oppression and the op-
pressor (Sorensen, 2008). The purpose of this difference is strategic 
as well as moral. Differentiating between the structure, the system, 
and the people that sustain and perpetuate oppression makes it easier 
to devise regime-change tactics because regime-members and regime-
supporters do not feel so much directly threatened. This difference is 
not being made in the case of Syria and it would be very difficult to do 
it given the characteristics of the State. Oppression is personified in 
the face of Bashar al-Asad, as personified is a regime which especially 
made an effort to develop a personal cult. The cult identifies the leader 
as the source of all good, of all power, and ultimately, of all legitimacy 
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(Wedeen, 1999). For Syrian citizens to break free of the state’s grip, 
the leader has to be exorcized, it has to be decrowned through ridicule, 
by exaggerating his flaws and putting him in degrading situations 
(Bakhtini, 1981). Bashar’s official picture thus can now be found in toi-
lets (See Pic. 6) or trashcans, associating him with the lowest and the 
eschatological and therefore bringing his high and untouchable image 
and “position” to the lowest and dirtiest level. We can find here the 
process of so-called “subversiting”, regaining the symbols of propa-
ganda (the leader’s pictures) to reverse and subvert their messages.
One of the characteristics of political humor, especially in what re-
gards caricature, is the building of personified “villains”. The villains 
can be identifiable members of the political or military elite, or rather 
nameless, stereotyped figures that represent the whole collective elite. 
This difference is important in the context of an authoritarian regime 
since sometimes the line of censorship is drawn in between. That is, a 
caricature of a chubby anonymous Arab politician hypocritically cry-
ing while seated on a pile of dead bodies (Pic.2) is acceptable because 
it represents the passivity of the political class as a whole and of Arab 
States regarding the Palestinians’ situation. Alternatively, a cartoon of 
Bashar al-Asad waiting to hitch a ride on Gaddafi’s car is not (see Pic-
ture 3). Direct and personified criticism is one of the red lines that 
cannot be crossed. Ali Ferzat, Syria’s best known cartoonist, knew 
where the red line stood18. He had already been censored under Hafez 
al-Asad and his satirical publication Al-Domari closed down under 
Bashar’s presidency after the disappointing Damascus Spring19. Al-
though Ali Ferzat had a long experience with censorship, he kept on 
publishing on the Kuwaiti newspaper when his caricatures were final-
ly seen as having crossed the line. In August 2011, after the publication 
18. “I did not choose to become a cartoonist. It is not an institution or a course that you can 
enroll into. I was born an artist, a critic - and even as a child I used to write cynical 
stories. It just so happens that my medium is art. The real motivation – the real mes-
sage is my cynicism.” AlJazeera Interview with Ali Ferzat on The Listening Post (Last 
Modified: 16th April 2012). 
19. The Damascus Spring was a movement that took place after the ascension to power of 
Bashar al-Asad in 2000 demanding overture and political rights, but was soon repressed 
and many of its leaders were incarcerated.
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of these pictures (Pic.3) Ali Ferzat was illegally kidnapped, allegedly by 
“Asad’s thugs”, beaten, and both his hands broken20. When his work 
started to get personal, but also when his caricatures were being car-
ried and used at demonstrations as anti-regime signs Ferzat’s cartoons 
became part of the confrontational actions to be repressed21. The same 
caricature took then different and deeper meanings because of the con-
text where it was being brought up. On an interview for the BBC, Ferzat 
says: “Before, I made sure not to draw any official that could be recog-
nized, even though my cartoons were based on real people. Even if 
someone in power felt they were being targeted, they wouldn’t say 
anything because that would be like confirming it really was them.” 22 
An example of the recurrent element of the villains as a topic can be 
found in the series of a puppet show posted on youtube. “Top Goon: 
Diaries of a Little Dictator” imagines what Bashar al-Asad is feeling 
throughout the events unfolding, showing him as a cruel dictator and 
mostly as a dumb and clueless fearsome tyrant (See Pic.21). The pup-
pet show started broadcasting through the internet in November 2011 
and finished its first 13 episodes on February 2012. The puppets speak 
in Syrian dialect and have a second entry with English subtitles, al-
though the Arabic version remains more popular with always thou-
sands more viewers23. The creators of this puppet show, called Masa-
sit Mati, are ridiculing the regime through four main villain-characters, 
the Syrian President, the Shabih or State’s thug, the TV-anchor and, 
occasionally the dead ghost of Hafez al-Asad who appears in Bashar’s 
dreams to tell him off or advise him on the best methods to repress the 
population. The show also makes Bashar say what protesters think he 
truly believes admitting the massacres, the influence of his family, tra-
20. See: http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/20/entertainment-us-syria-cartoonist-
idUSBRE82J0LA20120320
21. See http://www.theworld.org/2011/12/slideshow-syrian-cartoonist-not-silenced-by-
attack/ for a slideshow and explanation of a selection of Ali Ferzat’s cartoons.
22. Sebastian Usher. “Ali Ferzat: Revolution redefines art in Syria”. BBCNews. 25 March 
2012. Online: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17491184 
23. For the first episode, the viewers in Arabic were 25.748 whereas the Viewers with Eng-
lish subtitles were 18.725. The second episode follows the same pattern (14.521 in Arabic 
and 8.704 in English) as do the rest of the videos. Checked on the 2nd May 2012.
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dition, etc. Protesters and activists are also represented and even the 
creators of the show appear in flesh and bone, especially in the last 
episode of the first season, concealed with scarves and flags of the re-
sistance as a final act of bravery and defiance to the regime. 
The production of this puppet show can be seen not only as an open 
accusation to the regime and its leaders (as well as on state television 
and its propaganda), but also as a rewriting of the narrative. The show 
is sneaking into Bashar al-Asad’s life and presenting an imagined be-
havior, a specific way of thinking that although fictional attributes cer-
tain characteristics to Bashar al-Asad and suggests a wicked position 
and attitude of the ruler towards the ruled. In a way, the show fills the 
gaps that controlled state media don’t fill, imagining and inventing 
what lies beyond the scarce and carefully prepared public appearances 
of the dictator. 
Masasit Mati or Ali Ferzat’s sober approaches to criticizing the dicta-
torship and its violence contrast with the use of ridicule and animaliza-
tion of Bashar al-Asad by many activists. Mocking the intellectual ca-
pabilities and Asad’s flaws or inventing new ones was a common topic 
for chants, posters, videos or even transformation of official signs (Pic. 
5 and 12). Bashar al-Asad, an ophthalmologist, has been the target of 
jokes referring to his bad vision (Pic. 4), sometimes in connection to 
him ignoring what really is happening on the ground (especially in ear-
ly stages of the uprising) or just as plain insults to his person. 
The animalization of the dominants can also be found in the mock-
ery against the regime. The wordplay on Bashar al-Asad’s family 
name, which means lion in Arabic, is well known and used among ac-
tivists. The President’s long neck however has made him the target of 
caricatures depicting him as a giraffe, a donkey or lately, as a duck. 
Not that ducks are especially evil to Syrians. In March 2012, a long se-
ries of private emails were leaked to the British paper The Guardian. 
They were emails showing correspondence between Bashar al-Asad 
and different supporters of his trusting, or between him and his wife 
Asma al-Asad. The emails gave a glimpse at Asma’s luxurious shop-
ping tastes amid the worst months of the uprising and showed her as a 
cold-blooded woman. Mostly what enraged the Syrian activists and 
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population supporting the resistance was the crumbling of a some-
what spread idea that the leader was being held captive by his entou-
rage, and the proof that he was not dumb or blind to what was happen-
ing, but rather cynical and oblivious about it.  
The same element of mockery can be found in trans-border produc-
tions of political humor elaborated over the same “punch-line” in dif-
ferent formats. The discovery through the leaked emails that Bashar 
was being affectionately called “Bata” (duck in Arabic) by his wife, has 
added to the jokes concerning his animalization. Many photoshoped 
pictures or videos have overflown the net, videos and songs, some of 
them produced probably also outside Syria. On the streets in Syria, 
however, the use of this joke has also been evident. Pictures and videos 
of at least three demonstrations could be found where references to the 
duck were made, usually by carrying a plastic duck (in the village of 
Sirmin, Idlib) (See Picture 8) or even a real one (18th March 2012 in 
Berza, Damascus, see Pic. 9). AlArabiya news site also reported of pro-
testers chanting “You duck, may God damn your soul”. All motives 
and actions that deal with the animalization of the leader contribute to 
the breaking of fear against the regime, as a sort of exercise for bravery.
But not only the main leader is targeted by satire. Other jokes also 
refer to the main leaders and tycoons of the regimes —a photo of an 
obese Asian child with the capture indicating him to be the Syrian Am-
bassador to the United States Walid al-Mouallem—, references to 
businessman and the president’s cousin Rami Makhlouf in songs 
chanted during demonstrations24 or other jokes against Bashar al-As-
ad’s wife Asma. The vast bulk of the jokes, however, have been perma-
nently referring to Bashar al-Asad.
The FAlse reForms And oTher l Ies
The production and consumption of political humor draws its sources 
from key political events. In this sense political humor is strongly in-
24. See a translation in English of a protest song: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_3 
GNNPYubOE
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fluenced by the political context, the atmosphere of liberties or op-
pression, the thickness of resistance within society, the existence of 
criticism within the political structures, etc. It drinks from the sources 
of reality, of current events of political actors, of everyday issues of 
matter to the ruled, to twist them for the purpose of evading reality, to 
point its flaws or to blatantly oppose it. 
As it uses ridiculing and mocking as the main tool, it thus follows 
mainly the actions or words of the “enemy”, the villains. In a sense, 
political humor tries to hijack the regime’s narrative and reverse its 
meaning by exposing the absurdity or the inconsistence of the dis-
course with the deeds and the reality. There is an element of dialo-
gism, “using others’ words that are ‘ideologically saturated’ to repre-
sent our own meanings” (Badarneh, 2011).
The first three speeches of Bashar al-Asad following the beginning 
of the Uprising (including an interview to the American News Channel 
ABC) were fertile land for mockery. The expectation of what these 
speeches could bring (supported by the drawn-parallel that Mubarak 
had given three speeches before resigning) left only rage and disap-
pointment. Asad’s words were later deconstructed, analyzed and re-
claimed. The first speech after the events of Daraa was on the 30th 
March 2011 and it was delivered at the People’s Assembly among vivid 
cheers and exalted poetry of the regime supporters. Bashar al-Asad, 
cheerful and self-confident, dismissed the protests as a mere conspir-
acy undertaken by infiltrators. Hours later a Facebook group with 
thousands of members was in use. It was called the “Infiltrators”. On 
the third speech, on the 21st June, Asad stated that “[c]onspiracies are 
like germs, after all, multiplying every moment everywhere.” The fa-
cebook group, still currently active, Germs of Freedom (jrāthym al-
hurryat - ﺔﻳﺮﺤﻟا ﻢﻴﺛاﺮﺟ) was set up. This group had 4,320 members on the 
9th of May 2012. Chants of “the Syrian germs salute the Libyan rats” 
—in allusion to what Gaddafi called the Libyan opposition— could be 
heard in demonstrations during the first months. 
The Facebook group called The Chinese Revolution against the Chi-
nese Tyrant (al-thwrat al-s.ynyat d.d t.āghyat al-s.yn - ﻦﻴﺼﻟا ﺔﻴﻏﺎﻃ ﺪﺿ ﺔﻴﻨﻴﺼﻟا 
ةرﻮﺜﻟا) represents a critique to the censorship of the regime in a burlesque 
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attempt to trespass the red lines by targeting the Syrian regime with 
codenames from China. Demonstrations and actions are also described 
with changed names in line with what activists inside Syria (and all over 
the world in place of dictatorships) do with weather terminology: “It is 
raining in Homs”, meaning there are violent clashes, etc25. 
On the 7th of May 2012, parliamentary elections were organized 
across the country. The oppositions’ boycott was almost total. The boy-
cott was denouncing elections as yet another rough intent at presenting 
a political will that the regime’s Army was contradicting on the ground 
by continuing to repress peaceful demonstrations. For instance at least 
four videos where uploaded on the day of the Parliamentary elections. 
Two of them showed activists posing as regime’s supporters, one of 
them selling votes that were later cast on a garbage bin. As a parody, 
these actions act out the behavior of the “enemy” in the pretense of in-
troducing counter-meanings to their actions and discourses. This kind 
of actions shows “the gap between the regime’s words and its actions”26. 
And it is not only the formal structure of the regime which is spreading 
its lies, but also pro-regime media as the joke testifies: 
“If I tell lies, will I go to Al Akhrar [the afterlife],” a young boy asks 
his father. “No,” the father says, “if you lie, you go to Al Dounia [life on 
earth but also one of the Syrian pro-regime TVs] 27.
A grimmer action took place in Damascus where photos of martyrs 
of the Uprising were posted on walls as candidates to the elections. 
This can nevertheless be considered political humor, though macabre, 
because it takes up the institutional signification of “posters of parlia-
mentary candidates” to subvert it with the memory of the dead ones at 
the hands of the regime’s armed forces. 
Aiming subversion and direct confrontational action against the re-
gime and its supporters, a very controversial activist is Hossein Jabri 
and his phone-calls. He calls people within the regime (security forces, 
25. Related to me from personal conversations with inside activists.
26. Muhammad A. Badarneh, 2011:319.
27. Phil Sands. “As bloodshed in uprising grows, Syrians turn for protection to humour”. 
The National. Jun 23, 2011 http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/as-
bloodshed-in-uprising-grows-syrians-turn-for-protection-to-humour 
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known thugs, police…) adopting different personalities and pretend-
ing to be on their side to either get information or just ridicule them, 
often insulting and swearing strongly. The conversations that he ob-
tains via phone-calls are uploaded onto youtube, some of them getting 
more than 60.000 views. This was applauded by some and negatively 
perceived by other activists, as they distanced themselves from the 
foul language and the violent threats that Jabri sometimes uses.28 
b .  The InTernAT IonAl communITy :  sTAkeholders
And AudIence
In this category we have included different topics that have been sub-
ject of satire and that deal with actors and attitudes of foreign powers 
such as the United States of America, Qatar, Russia or Iran. The USA 
and Qatar were usually regarded as potential allies of the opposition 
whereas Russia and Iran were seen as supporting the regime and thus 
depicted. Other international actors were given a role in satirical mes-
sages: international organizations such as the United Nations Organi-
zation or the League of Arab States, and specifically the International 
Observers deployed as part of the Arab League Plan or the Joint Arab 
League and UN Plan lead by Kofi Annan. Throughout the events un-
folding every position or action undertaken by these actors found a 
response on the streets or the internet.
Many actions dealt with the issue of foreign intervention (the estab-
lishment of a buffer zone or a no-fly zone or even direct NATO-led 
military intervention) and international support through resolutions 
or sanctions against key regime personalities. Some of the actions that 
we had access to were pursuing to pressure the international commu-
nity by showing its slow-reaction or their lack of commitment. These 
actions have probably clearer goals than the former topics described: 
mocking the dictator might seem useless, but touching on the bad-
conscience of an international audience seems more direct to the 
point. The comedy builds up the guilt by selling the alternative narra-
28. See: http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/02/26/197119.html
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tive to the international community, depicted in form of complaint, 
victimization or seeking solidarity through appealing to shared com-
mon values (democracy, human rights, the Islamic humanist values 
within the Muslim community, etc.).
At the end of 2011, the League of Arab States sent a mission for the 
first time in the history of the organization to monitor and report on 
the violations of human rights that were taking place in Syria. They 
were deployed on the 27th of December 2011 and suspended their op-
erations one month after. During and after this time, the mocking of 
their failure took place along different formats, The messages of in-
competence and uselessness kept pressuring the Arab League to be 
more convincing and to take a stronger stand against the regime. 
From cartoons to street performances, different actions took place. 
However, the evidences I gathered had to do more with productions 
made for dissemination on youtube than for own consumption during 
demonstrations or street protests. Mocking videos were made with a 
small group of people in the middle of agricultural fields in Syria and 
specifically aimed at being recorded (theatre-like performance)29. 
There is therefore a clear understanding of the outer dimension of the 
conflict since protesters and opponents inside are acting minding the 
international community and its positions, trying to bend internation-
al public opinion in their favor. 
In April 2012, the UN deployed some 15 UN military Observers30 as 
part of the so-called Annan Plan to monitor a truce that started on the 
15th of the same month. The Annan Plan consisted of 6 points, amongst 
them, the return of all military brigades to the barracks. This point 
was not done and videos showed evidence of tanks still patrolling or 
being stationed on the streets, especially in Idlib, Homs or Hama. The 
death of civilians and the continuation of military reprisals were also 
evident. Some of these military operations even took place hours after 
the visits of UN Observers leading to the frustration of the opposition 
29. See for example this video in a mock-report from UgaritNews showing military and hu-
manitarian aid being transported into Syria by turtles: http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=7rki3dfISIM  
30. As part of the planned 300 that were to be deployed gradually on the ground.
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and raising serious doubts as to the effectiveness of these UN agents. 
In Bennish, a town in the Province of Idlib that has been producing a 
lot of different actions of nonviolent resistance, a group of activists 
dressed up as deaf and blind UN Observers —with cotton in their ears 
and wearing dark shades— participated in a demonstration against 
the regime mocking the UN mission as useless (see Pic.15). 
c .  The selF-represenTAT Ion oF The oppos I T Ion
Another of the important topics of satire is that of representing the op-
position. Its importance lies in the fact that it is an action of self-repre-
sentation that builds an image of the ideal Revolution and the legitima-
cy of its mission. This image seeks to counteract the regime’s accusations 
of protesters being “infiltrators”, “armed gangs” and “salafi-jihadists”. 
We can find a parallel on Naje alAli’s Palestinian Handala, the symbolic 
Palestinian child, a refugee that represents the moral conscience of the 
Palestinian cause. The child created by alAli, Handala, can be seen in 
keyrings, flags and all sorts of Palestinian imagery. In the Syrian Upris-
ing we do not find such a unified symbolic character, but we find in Kafr 
Nabel’s comic signs the figure of a young unarmed but brave protester 
that wears the colors of the revolution (See Pic. 19). The image of the 
protester is this young fearless man, but also children like the 13-year-
old Hamza AlKhateeb, one of the first child martyrs from Daraa and 
whose name has become that of a Brigade of the Free Syrian Army in 
Idlib. A Facebook page was created in his honor (We are all Hamza 
Alkhateeb, with more than 23.000 likes31).  The need for heroes, with 
local martyrs and local activists been inscribed in the memory of the 
uprising has thus to do with the moral stand of the movement, with the 
message that this uprising is seeking to convey.
Self-representation of the opposition is also conveyed through bur-
lesque, usually directed at taking the regime’s words and denying 
through exaggeration the allegations of being supported with arms 
31. Following the example of “We are all Khaled Saïd” one of the most popular facebook 
pages of activists of the Egyptian Revolution, in honor of the youngster beaten to death 
by the police agents in Alexandria on the 6th June 2010.
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and money from outside powers. The first known and widely popular-
ized video, to put but one example, was that of the activists from Homs 
providing a mocking news broadcast showing the alleged existence of 
terrorists armed with eggplants and zucchinis instead of real weap-
ons32. Later on, in February 2012, in one video allegedly from the 
north of Syria, province of Idlib, people greet the arrival of the Free 
Syrian Army, which is filmed riding on … donkeys and carrying hoes 
and shovels for weapons33. All these actions are being displayed in an 
intent to revert the arguments of Bashar al-Asad and his regime, to 
unveil the lies of his speeches by exposing the superlative innocence of 
the opposition. These superlative exaggerations thus work in both 
senses: they expose the regime’s wickedness and they emphasize the 
revolutionaries’ innocence and goodness. But the goal is also to pro-
mote the revolutionary side among undecided citizens:
“A friend of mine in Aleppo [which didn’t see major demonstrations 
until after months] was sent a package of nappies from another 
friend in a suburb of Damascus which has been protesting,” explained 
one resident of the capital. “He put a note with it saying, ‘join us if 
you’re a man, if not, these are for you’.” 34 
There has been some satire that breaks the spotless image of the op-
position and points some self-criticism, especially from the people in-
side Syria towards the exiled opposition. As a way of communication 
with other parts of the opposition, for instance, addressed to the Syri-
an National Council in its Istanbul meetings and its internal fights a 
poster in Amouda was reading “The Revolution is in Syria, not in Tur-
key” 35. Other chants or jokes that have circulated also refer to the in-
ternal division. One of the first slogans of the Uprising was “One, one, 
one, the people of Syria are one”. This slogan has been ironically 
transformed to “One, one, one, the people of Syria are twenty-three 
32. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SkDjmO-eWE4 
33. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PV-dYnuJLDg 
34. Phil Sands. “As bloodshed in uprising grows, Syrians turn for protection to humour”. 
The National. Jun 23, 2011 http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/as-
bloodshed-in-uprising-grows-syrians-turn-for-protection-to-humour
35. Note that Amouda, with a majority of Kurdish population, is especially sensitive and 
skeptical of Turkey’s support of the uprising.
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million and one”, alluding to the divisions and the leadership fight 
within the opposition.
3 .2 .  The plAce And The AudIence
Jokes and satire have no reason to be produced unless there is a second 
step of communication. Without communication, the production of sat-
ire is in vain since the producer of the action is not laughing alone but 
needs the complicity of an audience. The audience has to be complicit 
because if the receiver is against the feelings that the joke arise then the 
objective of its communication is opposed to the expected (Freud, 1966: 
133). In political satire these opposed feelings do not refer so much to 
feelings but rather to the political idea that the joke (in a broad sense) 
conveys. Thus, Bashar al-Asad was sharing a mock video of ‘how to hide 
a tank’ that goes unseen by the Arab League Observers36, but the shared 
meaning of the joke was opposed to the similar jokes or allusions that 
were made to the observers blindness. The fact that Observers were not 
spotting (or reporting) tanks in the streets of Homs was a target of 
mockery by the opposition as well as by the Baathist supporters where-
by the goal and target of the joke is 1) the same in the sense that the Ob-
servers are clueless to what is going on and 2) different in that opposi-
tion targets the regime and its brutality and the regime targets Burhan 
Ghalioun as head of the Syrian National Council and their failed efforts 
to engage the international community in the conflict.
In Egypt, Cairo’s Tahrir Square was the geographical focus point of 
the so-called “25th January Revolution” of 2011. In the square, jokes 
about Mubarak circulated, comic performances took place and new 
slogans and chants were made up to cheer the masses. These formats 
of political humor were mostly not made for the internet and news 
channels to capture and disseminate throughout the world. They were 
made mostly to be shared within the inhabited geographical spaces of 
the revolution while some of them were also broadcasted. 
36. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/video/2012/mar/14/syrian-tank-video-assad-
emails
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Although some journalists raced to baptize the events in Egypt as 
the “Facebook Revolution”, the social network was just one element in 
the web of factors and actions that took place and led to the downfall 
of Hosni Mubarak. In our focus on Syria, we found that most of the 
production of political humor was shaped by the space where it was 
produced and by the audience receiving and laughing at it, not pas-
sively, but sharing a message that, in their turn, made them support-
ers of the message behind the joke. For art or humor cannot only be 
produced, they have to be communicated as well, and the intentional-
ity of any act has to be shared by the agent as well as by the reader, 
viewer or receiver (Foucault, 1988). The spaces and formats in which 
political humor is produced and disseminated are thus essential to the 
message, to intentionality and to the impact they have. 
In the case of Syria, the difficult appropriation of spaces has made 
humor more fluid and more difficult to grasp. Part of it is being made 
with a clear intention to be broadcasted, as a message to the world out-
side Syria. The difficult and dramatic conquest of public space has made 
humorous and artistic actions more volatile and more difficult to share 
with others. Whether they are produced in Arabic dialect, or Kurdish, or 
English the expected audience differs. The spaces are not only neutral 
contextualizations and supports for the action, but rather they shape 
the action and the organizational structure itself. Spaces are therefore 
co-actors of the action, since they determine its language and its scope.
Also the group called “The Calendar of Freedom” has dyed Damas-
cus fountain waters red in memory of the martyrs dead during the up-
rising. Other activists’ dark humor related to the martyrs has been that 
of renaming the streets of Syria with the names of the martyrs of the 
uprising, tearing down the symbolic presence of the regime. This ac-
tion has taken place directly on the streets by replacing street signs 
and finds its parallel online through a google application called Map 
Maker37. And in parallel also Syrian artists from Damascus film them-
selves cutting out the graffiti stencils and spray-painting the walls of 
37. Reported by Sahar Khamis, Paul B. Gold and Katherine Vaughn, 2012. More details on 
http://ogleearth.com/2012/01/google-conspiring-for-regime-change-in-syria-
through-maps-hardly/ 
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the city with their signs. The main purpose of their action is to stamp 
the city with the face of the uprising. The morrow will return the rhet-
oric of the uprising to the heart of the regime and its supporters will be 
forced to erase or disfigure the signs and symbols. The internet, how-
ever, will immortalize the actions in a spaceless place. 
The actions locally and on the street, as well as the actions aimed at 
raising international support for the uprising, have developed a lot of 
humorous and satirical material, often macabre. These instruments of 
confrontation against the power and the State are issued and received 
locally and internationally and produce different effects depending 
on: the available resources; the perception of potential repression or 
suppression; and the chronological time of the revolt in which these 
actions are used. The revolt in the streets is nurtured by feedback and 
mobilization through the Internet and to an international audience. 
The internet has also a role of political awareness and transmission of 
information for the opponents, but also helps raise awareness within 
the international community about events in Syria. In other words, it 
spreads a narrative of events that confronts the State’s narrative. 
The difficulty for researchers of this entrenchment between space 
and spaceless places is to know exactly how much of these actions are 
being produced for internal consumption. “Internal audiences are 
more crucial than external supporters” Ackerman says (2006). The 
videos of the graffiti’s week, showing activists in the middle of the 
night spraying symbols of the revolution (a fist with a broken chain 
with the slogan of “Break with Humiliation” āksr qyd al-dhl - لﺬﻟا ﺪﻴﻗ 
ﺮﺴآا) immortalize the work of disobedience of reclaiming the streets 
through the walls. The painting of graffiti, as well as the hanging of the 
flag of the uprising (green, white and black horizontal stripes with 
three red stars in the middle) are much more dangerous acts of resist-
ance since they take place in spaces that are not conquered by the up-
rising. They become conquests, even if they might not last. They be-
come brief and fugacious spaces of resistance when the mark of the 
graffiti, the mark of the flag is there. 
On the other hand, and according to local accounts, the hope for an 
international intervention motivated in the first year of the Uprising 
41
the production of actions for external consumption, since there was a 
clear perception that the world was watching and would soon come to 
the rescue of the Syrian people as it had done in the Libyan case. How-
ever, as the conflict procrastinates and the hope of a quick interna-
tional intervention dwindles, actions could arguably be more directed 
to local consumption or turn to other targeted audiences.
3 .3  The messenger :  new AcT Iv IsTs or old
opponenTs?
The question of the authors of this political humor is perhaps the most 
complex. It is apparent that the organization of satirical actions is 
mainly locally organized and sometimes coordinated through internet 
with other local groups. Nevertheless, our purpose in this paper is not 
to determine the structure of these actions but its inclusion in the set 
of actions available to activists. The nature of activism, thus, its back-
ground and its entrenchment in the daily practices will not be ad-
dressed profoundly in this paper.  I will however briefly outline the 
main issues in reference to authorship since they might offer a per-
spective at the nature and source of this particular type of activism 
that further research could develop in the future. 
As we have seen, the places of these actions are usually public spac-
es -spaces usually tightly controlled by the regime- or the internet. In 
the case of public spaces there may be ways to preserve anonymity 
such as big demonstration where each one’s demands are included in 
the masses’ demands and therefore the threat for each person might 
seem less. Other activists also choose nights and unsurveilled spots to 
perform their acts. They preserve the action and get the message 
through while concealing the activist (the messenger). Other activists 
have chosen to show their faces and expose themselves to targeted 
persecution or killing. The same pattern can be found in armed oppo-
sitions, where some may hide their faces and others, who know their 
acts are already a declaration of war to the regime, who show their 
identity cards and faces on videos posted on youtube.
Precisely in political humor, most practices are entrenched in oral 
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tradition where the origin is hard to know and the message passes 
mouth-to-ear at the messenger’s will, while the messenger is not the 
author and the responsibility is thus diluted. After the murder of Ibra-
him Qashoush, for instance, some speakers that played his song in his 
honor were placed by activists at Arnoos square in Damascus.  When 
the speakers were taken down by the authorities “a Facebook page 
appeared calling for “Freedom for the speakers of Arnoos Square.” 38  
As we saw previously, a revolt is in need of martyrs and heroes that 
lead the way and sanctify the actions of those involved in the dissent. 
While everyone had heard Ali Ferzat’s name before the revolution, 
who had heard of Ibrahim Qashoush before March 15th 2011? Who had 
heard of “spray man” Nour Hatem Zahra (one of the graffiti artists) 
before he was killed? Syrians may have also heard of director Adnan 
Zaray that in 2001 directed the popular tv-series 2001 Buqa`t daw” 
(Spotlight) and popularized the story of “rajoul al bakhakh” or 
sprayman. In 2011 he supported the uprising and was arrested in Da-
mascus in March 2012. However, names like Nour Hathem Zahra or 
Abdelbasset Saroot (local goalkeeper), Bassel Shahade (amateur film-
maker) were not known before the uprising and they had remained 
mostly unknown activists until the repression of the regime fell upon 
them and made them martyrs.
3 .4 .  pol I T IcAl humor wITh In The sTruggle For
s Ign IF IcAT Ion 
So far, we decorticated the topics and formats used by activists when 
resorting to political humor. As we saw, these elements are consistent 
with political demands in demonstrations, in exiled oppositions and 
unfold along with the events on the ground and on the diplomatic 
scene. The permanent update of satire in relation to events follows the 
general strategy of the uprising when targeting the regime’s moral au-
thority. Professor Ackerman sees in nonviolent movements the pur-
38. C. Ella Wind. “Dark Humor Facebook pages of the Syrian Opposition” Jadaliya. 22nd 
August 2012. http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/6950/dark-humor-facebook-pages- 
of-the-syrian-opposition 
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pose of “discrediting the lies that an oppressive ruler uses to assert 
legitimacy, weakening the support that he needs to govern, and in-
terrupting his capacity to monopolize information and control 
events”39 (2002). These elements put forward by Ackerman are very 
useful to our analysis of political humor which plays a role in confront-
ing the regime. 
The different uses and purposes of political humor are evident in a 
non-democratic context. It is important to note that what is subver-
sive and what is not, does not depend only on the intentionality. Ali 
Ferzat’s caricatures might always have been a critique to the power, 
but when did they become a loud “voice” —in Hirschmann’s terminol-
ogy— instead of a concealed one? Who moved the line that was 
crossed? Was it Ferzat when his caricature depicted Bashar al-Asad? 
Or was it the state when it perceived that the caricature was strength-
ening the opposition’s legitimacy? It is only in open confrontation 
where an important impact of political humor can emerge. 
In the 21st century, however, the rules of censorship seem to have 
been diffused or rather to be easier to overcome, not because the line 
is not there anymore, but mainly due to two factors: 
a) The increasing importance of other unauthorized publishing spac-
es, particularly via the internet, as well as the overwhelming production 
of professional and amateur material. The “hidden transcripts” in 
James Scott words (Scott, 1977), the humor and acts of resistance that 
go concealed with everyday practices, can become open resistance when 
the spaces of production and of communication multiply40. 
b) The increasing distance between Oppressor and Oppressed 
(Oberschall in Bennani-Charïbi, 2004). The greater the separation be-
39. Peter Ackerman, and Jack DuVall. The right to rise up: people power and the Virtues of 
Civic Disruption. Vol. 30:2 Summer 2006
40. Although my research does not focus primarily on the agents using these tactics it must 
be said that there is a generational rift. It is not too much the use of the political humor 
but rather the spaces where it can be expressed, one stronghold being the online plat-
forms and new technologies. These atopic spaces represent an obstacle for older activ-
ists but also for the participants and receivers of these actions. The number of internet 
users in Syria (Population with access to worldwide network) was of around 20% (Total 
population: 20.447.000) in 2010. Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people) were 
less than 60, according to http://www.internetworldstats.com.
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tween the elite and the community is, the greater the social mobiliza-
tion and radicalization can be. This radicalization of social movements 
can also be found in the increasing daring of political humor. A Bah-
raini artist, reflecting on his country’s 2011 uprising and his own atti-
tude, says: “There are no more limits in my drawings, my pencil is fi-
nally liberated”41.
The costs of political humor increase as the regime tries to prevent 
further spill-over of opposition-supporters. Public display of support 
is strongly encouraged and hesitations become signs of possible sup-
port to the opposition. Thus the regime increases the repression, un-
willingly also increasing the value of the actions undertaken by activ-
ists. The cyberwar undertaken by the regime, infiltrating facebook 
pages, impersonating users, developing Trojans and tracking the ac-
tivists IPs to arrest and torture the authors shows the importance of 
these tools. 
The best known case of the cost of satire is that of Ibrahim Qash-
oush, supposed to be either a fireman or mason. He became a poet 
(satirist) of the revolution (‘the nightingale of the revolution’) and was 
found dead on the shore of river Orontes at the beginning of July 2011 
with the vocal cords stripped out. He was the alleged author of songs 
that are still being chanted in every demonstration around the coun-
try. His assassination was a desperate act intended to “quench” the 
origins of a challenging chant. However, the roots of the chant were 
buried in the oral expression of folk culture of the oppressed as states 
the fact that the title of “the nightingale of the revolution” has been at-
tributed to, at least, three different authors. Interesting to note also, 
that the melody of his chanting (with different words) has also being 
used in pro-regime demonstrations, in an intend to counter-act its 
message.
The slogan “Stop the killing, we want to build a homeland for all 
Syrians” that a girl used in April for the first time recorded in the cen-
tral of Damascus42 is a perfect use of euphemism as a strategy used by 
41. Oun, 2012. [Author’s own translation from French.]
42. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-SkfR4OjqJk 
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the oppressed to oppose the dominant. In this sense, the slogan was 
apparently non-partisan and was not explicitly supporting the upris-
ing but merely expressing a naïve desire to end the confrontation. In 
as much as the Syrian government is saying to be fighting against ter-
rorists who are the prime origin of massacres, the action undertaken 
by the girl puts the regime in a difficult position. Repressing her would 
mean recognition of the state’s responsibility in the killings. Alterna-
tively, not repressing the action would allow a previously unauthor-
ized political action to take place and, in a sense, a social site for ex-
pression to be carved out in the heart of the capital.
The intentionality of satire, thus, seems to be part of the tactics used 
in social movements as expressed by Ackerman (2006). The direct 
goals of political humor are mocking, ridiculing, delegitimizing, ex-
posing the lies of the regime, highlighting abuses, supporting martyrs 
and other protesters or even spreading rumors. Political Humor as 
part of the strategy contributes to the uprising in transmitting ideas, 
concepts and even ideologies sometimes faster and stronger than oth-
er “serious” actions (an article on a newspaper, a political speech, a 
press release or a human rights report). Political humor is trying to 
persuade and bring to the side of the revolution the supporters of the 
regime that might weaken their trust in it; passive supporters of the 
regime that could feel more confident to join the revolution within a 
nonviolent movement; and the international community that will de-
cide to strongly engage in confronting the Syrian regime. 
However, it must not be forgotten that comic actions also provide 
reassurance and psychological relief to activists, recreating a fictive 
space where reality is mastered, where tanks are just ordinary vehi-
cles to be washed and lubricated, where dictators are just ducks and 
silly men to be scorned and where victory is already celebrated. This 
is in fact one of the most analyzed aspects of political humor in a non-
democratic context. Under a dictatorship, jokes are told in the inti-
macy of a home, among friends or people that know and trust each 
other. They are an act of opposition that builds shared narrative and 
meanings mainly among the people unhappy with the regime. It 
hardly ever leaves the circle of those already convinced or part of the 
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opposition. This intimate circle where jokes or meanings are shared 
grows where the open confrontation grows, and thus has been the 
case of the Syrian uprising, where satire has left the safety of a family 
household, of two good old friends whispering at each other and has 
joined the ranks of daylight confrontation.  Political humor can open 
up the space for critics bringing down the first layer of fear. As in 
Egypt’s Tahrir Square during the days that preceded the ousting of 
the President Hosni Mubarak, the goal of this humor was to “build 
community, strengthen solidarity, and provide a safe, thug-free 
outlet for Egyptians to defy the regime”43 in a way, laughter was a 
spell against fear. 
Be it for personal or collective consumption among revolutionaries 
or with the purpose of undermining the regime’s support, the cycle of 
the tactics is the same. The state narrative was the only possible public 
narrative imposed to all inside Syria before the beginning of the Upris-
ing and political humor develops itself through three steps that deal 
with the public narrative:  deconstruct the long-time official narrative; 
rebuild and reclaim a new narrative; and spread the new symbolic 
power longtime immobilized in the clenched fist of the State. 
A .  deconsTrucT Ing The reg Ime ’s  nArrAT Ive
As we have seen, satire can contribute to destabilize the power rela-
tions, snatching public support that was fuelled and controlled 
through the cult and the symbolic power enforced by the regime and 
complied by the population. Through subverting the meanings of offi-
cial narrative and the once-unchallenged obedience to the symbols 
and rites it breaks down the totalitarianism of the official narrative. 
The meanings and words of the dominants are primarily voided of 
their sense when they become part of the joke and thus political hu-
mor is stealing the symbolic production that provided the legitimacy 
and justification of the existence of the regime. 
43. http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/02/laugh-o-revolution-hu-
mor-in-the-egyptianuprising/71530/#slide1 
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The Syrian regime is now at odds to make the population belie- 
ve that they are the only ones able to save the country from chaos, 
that the only alternative will be sectarian war and fundamentalist 
rule. One of the pro-regime graffiti repeated throughout the country 
states it: “Asad or we burn the country” (ā’sd āw nh. rq bldnā - ﺎﻧﺪﻠﺑ 
قﺮﺤﻧ ؤا ﺪﺳا). It is a coercive threat, but it implies also a belief, the dis-
course that the opposition questions and challenges. The regime’s 
narrative is still there and still trying to impose its absolutism over 
other narratives, but these other alternative narratives have emerged 
from the “concealed voices” and are now openly questioning the of-
ficial voices.
b .  rebuIld Ing And reclA ImIng The symbol Ic
producT Ion
A new alternative narrative that breaks through the quasi totalitarian 
control of the regime helps promoting a culture of resistance. The goal 
is to contribute not only to break the narrative of the regime and free 
all possible alternatives but also to create a specific and alternative 
symbolic production, giving new meaning to the events, to the actors, 
to the actions, and sharing these new significances with a growing part 
of the population and of course of the stakeholders. 
In what Badarneh calls dialogism, comedy is used as “a ‘centrifugal’ 
power that moves the individual away from what the regime says” 
(2011). A teacher from Damascus, who calls herself Joumana Maar-
ouf, writes in a letter published by LeMonde, that the meaning of 
words is changing and is part of the political struggle that is going on 
in Syria. The word “freedom” itself, even if it has always been part of 
the official slogan of the Baath Party44 is now a term that has been con-
quest by the opposition45. Wanting freedom, as generic as it may 
sound, means currently to many Syrians, to be with the opposition. 
Alternatively the monhabikins are now those who support the regime, 
44. “Unity, Freedom and Socialism”
45. http://syrie.blog.lemonde.fr/2012/04/23/lettres-de-syrie-2/ 
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called by that name in satirical reference to the wide-spread official 
posters of Assad under the slogan of “Monhabik” (We love you).
c .  spreAdIng The new nArrAT Ive
In Egypt, a blogger by the name of Amrani says that “[t]here was a lot 
of spontaneous humor — it is the Egyptian character — but there also 
was a desire to show that the demonstrators weren’t just angry 
young men, that they weren’t just seen as Islamists”46. In this sense 
Amrani also sees humor as part of a show, part of a performance to 
campaign for the audience the good intentions, the good character of 
the revolutionaries. It is thus also part of the propaganda. The artist, 
the performer, the protester bearing the sign or the hundreds singing 
a satirical song, conveys an idea, a message and a narrative. Through a 
comic, fantastic or exaggerated form, there is always a chore truth —or 
recognized among the authors as a chore truth— to be transmitted 
that can more easily reach the outsiders and lure them to join the com-
munity of shared values and symbols.
4 .  F InAl remArks
Power is not merely sustained by violence and coercion. The ability of 
a regime to make people believe in it or to force them to act as if they 
believed in it lies not only in coercive power but also in authority, and 
the capacity to monopolize what some scholars call symbolic power 
(Bourdieu, 1991; Wedeen, 1999). The efforts deployed by the Syrian 
State to “persuade” the people of its legitimacy and therefore of its au-
thority to exert power show us the importance of other means other 
than violence. Ever since the rise of strong pan-Arab, non-aligned 
leaders in the region, and in the Syrian case with Gamal Abdelnasser 
(president of the short-lived United Arab Republic), but especially 
with Hafez al-Asad, Syria’s regime has deployed resources and efforts 
46. http://www.arabist.net/blog/2011/4/6/humor-and-the-egyptian-revolution.html 
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to monopolize and write the sole possible narrative of events in the 
country and about it. The battleground for opposition to the regime is, 
therefore, not only that of gaining the means to control organized vio-
lence, since power is not exclusively based on it. There is another bat-
tleground other than violence, that of the authority, which entails a 
respect, an individual and collective acceptance of the existence of the 
institution, leader or entity. 
As Hannah Arendt states, “the worst enemy of authority is, there-
fore, disdain and the safest means to undermine respect is laughter” 
(Arendt, 2012:62). In this sense, we have tried to analyze in this study 
if and how political humor can be included in the set of actions that the 
population is using and perceiving as a tool to confront the regime. In 
line with Hannah Arendt’s reasoning, most of the satirical produc-
tions we found during the first year of the Uprising was directly target-
ing the Syrian leader’s authority and contributing to the loss of respect 
of the population towards him. Other actions inscribed in political hu-
mor were focusing on other international stakeholders or on a self-
representation of the revolutionary. Activists were fighting directly in 
the symbolic battlefield at high costs and as a decisive part of the 
struggle for regime-change.
This brings us to the conclusion that the producers of political hu-
mor during the Uprising see themselves as part of the resistance and 
opposition. This is an important reflectivist assumption on the nature 
of intent by the activists. Even though the activists might not be col-
lectively organized or broadly coordinated and that they might decide 
the use of certain actions individually, they are “aware of their com-
mon interests and distinct identity, and that they [are] self-con-
sciously seeking a set of changes […]” (Tilly, 1977:3), and important 
elements that determines their inclusion in the movement against the 
regime.
We have described in this research these series of actions undertak-
en by opposition activists from a humoristic approach that challenge 
the Syrian regime. Through the events of the first year of the Syrian 
Uprising, political humor has proved a feasible and used tactics along 
50
with other confrontational tactics. Political humor is used during 
demonstrations (in street theatre, carrying of puppets, objects or bur-
lesque slogans) or isolated as an action against the regime per se in its 
trespassing of the red lines. In this sense, actions can be coordinated 
—Graffiti Week, The Calendar for Freedom— or they can also be unco-
ordinated acts that are locally using a ‘liberated’ meaning or comical 
significations —i.e., the duck— to be inscribed in broader coordinated 
actions such as demonstrations. 
Throughout the rising of the confrontation, more actions of political 
humor could be found. Our conclusion here is that, contrary to what 
might appear, the actions of political humor become part of the reper-
toire of actions available to protesters in a context of open and wide-
spread political struggle. They do not stay only in the hidden tran-
scripts but are also used in the battle for legitimation. The actions of 
political humor have a purpose aligned with that of the uprising and 
they become 1) more daring and 2) more common, when confronta-
tion between regime and oppositional groups rises. The costs of using 
political humor are similar to those before the uprising or can even be 
more —since repression can become more susceptible and brutal— 
but the benefits are higher because humor ads up to the other actions 
being undertaken and the self-censorship crumbles, rendering humor 
more direct and openly confrontational. 
More evidence of open and confrontational political humor on the 
streets as well as on the social media has been found throughout the 
uprising than previous to it. Self-censorship has been lowered due to 
the increase of political support to resistance among the population, 
for instance in the case of Ali Ferzat. This increased support raised the 
benefits of using unveiled political humor while the costs (repression, 
censorship) remained the same or even rose. When a political minori-
ty turns into a perceived majority, political humor can become chal-
lenging and be adopted as a channel or tool for critique and protest. 
Political humor in Syria has shown its intent at challenging the offi-
cial’s discourse, unveiling other significances of the regime’s policies 
and actions as well as putting pressure on the international commu-
nity. These actions as inscribed in a broader strategy gain more impact 
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and become part of a set of actions used by activists as the open con-
frontation spreads in other levels and through other tactics of nonvio-
lent resistance.  
Humor has traditionally been given little importance when study-
ing social movements and popular protests. As an oppositional move-
ment, humor is seen as part of the “hidden transcripts” or the infra-
politics, that is the actions that are invisible or almost unintelligible to 
the dominants and that hardly count as political acts (Scott, 1985)47. 
The dichotomy, as any attempt to systematize social reality, is always 
a simplification of a continuum reality where categories are much blur 
than in abstract academics. Drawing on Bourdieu’s argument that ac-
tions of protest learn from daily practices of the ordinary, we might 
understand political humor as a parallel strategy of concealed opposi-
tion at a given time that can however become an open act of confron-
tation against the regime and be included in the repertoire of actions 
available to the opposition (Tilly, 1977). It does not mean, however, 
that concealed actions of political humor will be performed in an open 
confrontation by the same actors or even in the same form. Confron-
tation with the regime can be graded, from parliamentary or accepted 
opposition, political opposition in exile, to public displays of collective 
opposition (demonstrations, strikes…), general uprising, and armed 
opposition, being civil war the highest point of confrontation (highest 
in terms of costs) between rulers and ruled. Since all of these situa-
tions can co-exist, what is important is the weight of certain tactics 
and strategies at a given time, namely a) the public support of the 
population towards them and b) the possible impact to severe the 
power’s authority and subvert the power relations between rulers and 
ruled. 
In this sense, the claim made by many scholars and analysts that 
political humor is part of a veiled fruitless critique to a regime 
(Hirschmann, 1970), or even counterproductive as a regime-change 
or regime-transformation tool (Giddens, 1984; Badarneh, 2011), can 
be challenged by this research. The inclusion in one or another catego-
47. James Scott, 1985.
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ry is not only based on the topic, intentionality or format of the act but 
rather on the context of confrontation where the act is produced and 
communicated. The increase of the benefit that satirical acts bring to 
the resistance makes of comic acts a feasible and useful act to be in-
cluded and used in the repertoires of actions of the protesters. 
No clear-cut can be made as whether political humor is challenging 
or unchallenging, but we can confirm that it can purposely become 
challenging and unveiled as it has done in the Syrian case. Further-
more, we can see how similar actions can move from a hidden con-
frontation to an open one when the socio-political context changes 
and thus become part of the set of actions available to activists to chal-
lenge a regime. 
From populAr upr Is Ing To c Iv Il  wAr :
The role oF pol I T IcAl humor In An
ever-chAngIng conFl IcT
Our research did not address the issue of the impact that an increased 
stage of violence and civil war might have on the use of nonviolent 
strategies such as political humor. The amount of comedy has actually 
increased progressively during the first year of the uprising, along 
with mass demonstrations and other initiatives of popular resistance. 
This has been so even after the first violent clashes between the Syrian 
Army and armed rebel groups. It is not clear however how in a state of 
civil war or generalized armed clashes humor can be kept as a popular 
tool among activists, especially those inside the country and suffering 
directly from violence. When armed confrontation becomes progres-
sively the most determinant scenario, political humor might become 
less important, like other peaceful demonstrations and other actions 
of mass nonviolence. Nonviolent actions that might still be useful 
could be more linked to undermining the material power of the regime 
(sabotage, army defections and other forms of disobedience), since 
the symbolic power, the authority of the state, has already been lost by 
the regime or is perceived as not so central anymore. The regime loses, 
not its power, but its authority that had been gained by legitimacy (of 
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the past) or by justification (of present and future). When authority is 
lost, coercive measures become exponentially paramount in main-
taining control over the state power. 
When the death toll is estimated at 30.000, not many are left to 
laugh. Laughter is however still present in the revolution in Septem-
ber 2012. Its role and its position in the set of actions has however 
varied in reference to that of the first year of the Uprising. Still many 
jokes are being told and posters with cartoons are seen in demonstra-
tions. However rich and crude jokes are told against the shelling of 
bombardment, theses jokes are mostly found in the concealed life of 
the private sphere or among larger groups of dissidents. It is obvious 
that the taboo has been broken. However, political humor seems to 
have lost its place in the set of actions available to activists in their 
struggle against the regime. Political Humor as other forms or nonvio-
lent activism are still being performed, but their importance vis à vis 
the military and armed struggle has dramatically dwindled.
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Annex 1 :  s Igns And symbol Ic
cATAlogue
Picture 1. Naje al-Ali’s cartoon depicting the criminalization of the 
Palestinian people.
Picture 2. Cartoon by Ali Ferzat, previous to the Uprising, depicting 
an Arab leader full of jewelry and crying on top of a pile of dead 
bodies. 
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Picture 3. Syrian President Bashar al-Asad hitching a ride from 
Libyan former Dictator Muammar Ghaddafi. By Ali Ferzat. Behind al-
Asad we see Walid Mouallem.
Picture 4. ‘This is how Asad looks’ says the sign being held by a 
protester. The poster plays with the medical training of the President 
(as an ophthalmologist) and with the fiction of his discourse in 
relation to what is really happening in the country. 
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Picture 5. One of Asad’s official photos, transformed into a mockery 
with the president wearing donkey ears and the official slogan “We 
love you” transformed into “We throw you out”. Other written words 
are “Topple”, “Curse your soul” and “tfou” (an Arabic voice to express 
disgust).
Picture 6. Toilet with the broken picture of the Syrian President. 
(Source: http://yfrog.com/h687735278j)
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Picture 7. Different ways for a duck to die: following the disclosure 
of Asad’s private correspondence, the duck became the symbol of the 
President’s personae. The pictures express the wish of the activist to 
end with Bashar al-Asad’s life.
Picture 8. Protesters in Sirmin carrying a plastic duck during a 
demonstration, also a symbolic Bashar al-Asad.
Picture 9. Protesters in Damascus carrying a live duck during a 
demonstration
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Picture 10. “Go away JinTao”, written in Arabic, supposedly in Syria. 
This was posted in the Facebook page of the “Chinese Revolution” and 
plays on the replaced discourse of the Syrian Revolution by the Chinese 
Revolution (Jin Tao is the current president of the Republic of China 
and thus holds the same rank as Bashar al-Asad)
Picture 11. “Homs’ Wash and Lubricated international for Tanks” 
(mghsl w mshh.m h.ms. al-dwly l-ldbābāt ), categorized as a local 
business with 67.144 likes on the 9th of May 2012. 
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Picture 12. On the road to Homs, as the picture reads, a sign 
(probably photoshoped) limiting the speed of tanks.
Picture 13. Street performance of the armed opposition: Before the 
public presentation of the Free Syrian Army on the 24th of July 2011 
by Riad al-Asad, the opposition was denying any violent or armed 
action from the activists’ part, sticking to the slogan that the Uprising 
was totally peaceful.
Picture 14. Mock campaign posters in Zabadani show faces of those 
killed by the regime forces in the neighborhood. The fakeness of the 
parliamentary elections is unveiled by the memory of the ongoing 
struggle and repression.
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Picture 15. Mock-UN Observer in the town of Bennish (April 2012). 
This activist reports for Al-Jazeera and other media posing as a blind 
and deaf UN Observer, a week after the deployment of the first staff of 
the Annan Plan.
Picture 16. Mohammed Dib (head of the League of Arab States 
mission) offering a rose to “prostitute-like” Bashar al-Asad Both 
smile and remain carefree of the dead bloody bodies next to them. 
Occupied Kafr Nabel (18th January 2012)
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Picture 17. The banner on the left reads “Not only is it an Arabian 
Spring it is a tsunami that will uproot all the dictatorships all over 
the world”. Occupied Kafr Nabel 10/02/2012”
Picture 18. Mohammed Dib, head of the Arab League’s mission, 
with a tank on his head says “I didn’t see any tanks at all!”. Another 
mockery of the inefficacity of the Arab League’s mission.
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Picture 19. Occupied Kafr Nabl 1st February 2012. A caricature by a 
local unknown artist showing Iranian Ayatollah Khamenei and 
Russian Primer Minister Putin blowing air into Bashar, characterized 
as a balloon. On the left of the drawing a young male activist dressed 
with the colors of the revolutionary flag stings the balloon. The clear 
message is the fact that activists are trying to topple the regime 
(personified in Bashar al-Asad’s Picture) while Iran and Russia’s 
governments are supporting and helping it.
Picture 20. Bashar comfortably sitting on his throne on a pile of 
dead bodies while Putin stops a rock which reads “Security Council” 
in reference to the repeated vetos of Russia to UNSC resolutions 
regarding Syria. Occupied Kafer Nabel 3rd February 2012
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Picture 21. Frame of Episode 8: Beeshu’s Birthday. In this frame we 
see the character of Bashar al-Asad and another character 
representing a member of the Shabiha (shabyh.a) or paramilitary 
groups.
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Annex 2 :  InTerneT resources
For AnAlys Is  (selecT Ion)
434343aaa. Homs- Bayada. Girl singing with pain with great Sa-
rout. Youtube. 10th December 2011. http://www.youtube.com/watc
h?v=B8lKU67mwHE&feature=related
Aljazeera Report on the Mocking Performance about the UN Observ-
ers in Bennish. April 2012. ﺎﻳرﻮﺳ ﻲﻓ ﻦﻴﺒﻗاﺮﻤﻟا رود ﺪﺴﺠﺗ ﺶﻨﺑ ﺔﻨﻳﺪﻣ ﻲﻓ ﻦﻴﻄﺷﺎﻨﻟ 
ﺔﻴﻠﻴﺜﻤﺗ ﺪهﺎﺸﻣ ةﺮﻳﺰﺠﻟا ﺮﻳﺮﻘﺗ http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O07pJjA 
0m3M
ApoloRecord1. Hussein Jabri in Conversation with security service 
in Tartous. Youtube. 13th September 2011. http://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=yY4CwnMUu4k
Arab Cartoon House (Beit alCartoon). www.arabcartoon.net/
Astaphan Bilokheen. Free... Free Girl. Youtube. 17th March 2012 http:// 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=OMU_GarHPgQ&feature=share 
Brother Taum Sketch on Youtube. 31st December 2011. http://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=fDQIh4KJ4GE&feature=related
Facebook group of Germs for Freedom/ Jarathem AlHouria https://
www.facebook.com/groups/JARATHEM.ALHOURIA/ Last entered 
on: 16th May 2012
Facebook group. A million signatures to prosecute Bashar al-Asad 
and his gangs. 17th June 2011. Facebook. https://www.facebook.
com/ProsecutingSyrianRegime (18,798 likes). 
Facebook group. The Banners from Kafranbel. 13th April 2012. htt-
ps://www.facebook.com/pages/The-banners-from-Kafran-
bel/266833380075428 (157 likes)
Facebook group. The Chinese Revolution.  1st June 2011. https://www.
facebook.com/COMEDY.AND.COMEDY (108,503 likes)
Facebook group. Posters from Amouda. https://www.facebook.com/
amuda.amuda.amuda (17,383 likes)
Farzat, Ali. Cartoons. CreativeSyria. http://creativesyria.com/farzat.
htm
FreedomwoBas: http://www.youtube.com/user/FreedomWoBas
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Graffiti video in Damascus. 28th April 2012 http://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=WvjST9MueqI&feature=g-hist
HaniKhashfeh. Syrian Digging. Youtube. 10th December 2011. http://
www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=N1tu 
Yf4Zn1U (“Ktir Salbe”-Monday 8:30 PM on MTV Lebanon-Written 
By Jiscar Lahoud & Nabil Assaf Directed BY Hani Khashfeh)
Kamarbake. Street performance with collective sign in Bennish. 26th 
April 2012. Youtube. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=he6CN4l
0V00&feature=player_embedded
Kharabeesh Arab Cartoons http://www.youtube.com/user/Khara-
beeshCartoons
Kharabeesh. Bashar Asad Latest Speech. 20th June 2011. Youtube 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=endscreen&v=yPNrsdpl
Aus&NR=1
KurdWatchOrg. Ciwan Haco, Şivan Perwer, and other Kurdish art-
ists support the Syrian revolution. Youtube. 6th February 2012. 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JBQtEHbQcTY
Mahjoob http://www.mahjoob.com/
Masasit Mati. Top Goon Diaries’. Series on Youtube. 8th November 
2012 http://www.youtube.com/user/MasasitMati?feature=g-all-s
Mocking Video of Parliamentary Elections in Aleppo 07/05/2012. 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=swqu44663Fs&feature=g-hist 
Mocking Video of Parliamentary Elections in Maydan, Damascus 
07/05/2012. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=drtuisnO3cc&fea 
ture=g-hist
Mocking Video of Parliamentary Elections in unknown location 
07/05/2012. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3TA0D4eRBNg& 
feature=g-hist 
Mocking video on Foreign Aid. Idlib. 20th March 2012. Al Taah Idlib 
ﻢﻴﻄﺤﺗ ﺔﻔﻬﻧ, ﺐﻟدا ﺢﺘﻟا ﺖﻳرﺎﻏوأ عﺮﺳاوﺮﺤﻟا ﺶﻴﺠﻟا ﺢﻴﻠﺴﺗو ﺔﻴﻧﺎﺴﻧﻹا تﺎﻧﻮﻌﻤﻟا لﺎﺳرا نﺄﺸﺑراﺮﻗ 
عﺮﺳاذﺎﺨﺗإ ﻲﻓ ﺲﻴﻨﻴآ ﻢﻗر  http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_
embedded&v=7hUYPQ7g2pw
Mousa4hak. Daria, painting of the Man of the Spray. 24th April 2012. 
Youtube. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IkbhLQdJI0Q&featu 
re=g-hist
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Offendum. Omar Offendum | #SYRIA (Prod. by Sami Matar). You-
tube. 19th March 2012. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TXjEW
rhkb6g&feature=youtu.be
Song: Al-Batta Bashar Al-Assad - After Leaking His Private Emails 
With Hadeel Al-Ali 2012-03-16. Syrian Revolution 2011. http://
www.syrianrevolution2011.com/videos/player/tabid/68/videoid/ 
9612/---------song-albatta-bashar-alassad-after-leaking-his-pri-
vate-emails-with-hadeel-alali-20120316.aspx
Syriaisfree1. Damascus – Berza: Flag of the Syrian Independence. 
Youtube. 27th March 2012. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=94
HoSgBzCp4&feature=youtu.be
SyrianFilms. Urgent: Infiltration into Bashar al-Assad’s webcam 
during the browsing of his letters. 26th April 2012. http://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=iz7x4K_lSYk&feature=g-all-u
SyrianFreedomYT. Syrian Revolution Protest - “Fallen Fallen Bashar” 
[English Translation] Youtube. 14th April 2012. http://www.you-
tube.com/watch?v=_3GNNPYubOE
SyrianWeek. . Video of the Campaign “Break your chains” in Kafer 
Soussa. 23rd April 2012. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jdR9w 
Jwhzfo&feature=g-hist
SyrianWeek. SyrianWeek: Campaign Break your chains in the city of 
Sweida. 23rd April 2012. Youtube. http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=BeSan5THwO8&feature=g-hist
SyrRevo2011. Iranian opposition Permanent Revolution Syrian 
great song. [In Farsi]. 30th April 2012. http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=hgB_9I82QjY&feature=related 
Sytrainer1. This is not a movie trailer! This is Syria! Youtube. 14th 
March 2012. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oGtRiCjWmr8
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